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Early 2015 is a momentous time for Af-ghanistan, with deep uncertainty about the post-2014 environment. The man-
date of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) has come to an end even as po-
litical transition from the administration of 
President Hamid Karzai is perhaps only part-
ly resolved. The Taliban insurgency remains 
strong enough to pose a significant challenge 
to the Afghan government, and a negotiated 
end to the ongoing conflict seems unlikely in 
the very near term. Economic growth, heavily 
fueled by ISAF spending in addition to devel-
opment assistance, may suffer significantly 
as those external sources of funding decline. 
Narcotics, a significant portion of the Af-
ghan economy for the past decade, could be 
poised to assume even greater importance 
in these circumstances, with major conse-
quences for Afghanistan, the region and the 
rest of the world.
Despite these concerns, post-2014 Afghani-
stan may not be a catastrophe. The political 
transition may yet result in a more broadly 
inclusive government that could help limit 
ethnic and regional tensions. Combined with 
significant reduction in the number of foreign 
troops, successful political transition might 
weaken the appeal of the Taliban and ulti-
mately allow a negotiated settlement in the 
medium term. Reduced conflict could allow 
modest but sustainable economic growth. 
In conjunction with a robust counternarcot-
ics campaign, these circumstances could at 
least limit a post-2014 expansion in Afghan 
narcotrafficking.  
The future of Afghan narcotrafficking is one 
of the major shared interests of both the Rus-
sian Federation and the United States. It re-
mains so even in the current political climate. 
Since 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has 
organized and hosted meetings of the Joint 
U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Nar-
cotrafficking to discuss ways to constructive-
ly and jointly enhance bilateral and multilat-
eral efforts against narcotics.
Joint efforts between the Russian Federation 
and the United States to assess and shape 
the post-2014 environment may be particu-
larly fruitful given the prior Soviet experience 
with Afghanistan withdrawal and transition. 
Indeed, many senior Russian policymakers 
have personal experience with this process, 
which was much more successful than many 
analysts anticipated. Lessons from the pre-
vious withdrawal and transition are useful 
for the current context. As this report notes, 
political cohesion and external support were 
critical to both the surprising longevity and, 
subsequently, the equally surprising demise 
of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 
(DRA). 
Introduction
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The working group is working to produce 
consensus reports to inform the Russian and 
U.S. governments as well as Afghan, regional 
and international stakeholders. In Afghan 
Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, 
the working group comprehensively outlined 
the threats that Afghan heroin poses to the 
Russian Federation, the United States and 
the broader international community. A se-
ries of follow-up reports will focus on specific 
issues related to Afghan narcotrafficking, and 
this report is the first in this series. 
This first follow-up report has a broad focus 
on the post-2014 environment in Afghanistan 
with an emphasis on how that environment 
will affect the challenge of narcotrafficking. 
The Joint Threat Assessment concluded: 
“The effectiveness of any development and 
enforcement strategies against illicit drugs 
is likely to hinge on improved security. That, 
in turn, may require tangible progress on a 
political solution to the ongoing conflict in Af-
ghanistan.”1 As a result, the future of efforts 
to counter narcotrafficking is intimately con-
nected to these broader developments. As 
this report discusses, the political and securi-
ty environment in Afghanistan could become 
much worse after 2014 with a corresponding 
worsening of the narcotrafficking threat. This 
underscores the imperative need for Russian 
and U.S. policymakers to find the political will 
to resume and perhaps even increase coop-
eration despite ongoing differences on other 
issues. Together with regional partners and 
international organizations, renewed Rus-
sian-U.S. cooperation presents the best hope 
for a brighter future.
Although the high levels of uncertainty re-
garding the post-2014 environment make it 
impossible to offer definitive predictions, it 
is nonetheless possible to sketch likely sce-
narios. This report proceeds in three parts. 
First, it briefly reviews the Soviet experience 
of withdrawal and transition in the late 1980s 
in order to illustrate both previous lessons 
and potential pitfalls. Second, it offers a con-
cise summary of the security, political and 
economic environment in Afghanistan as of 
late 2014. Third, using the first two sections 
as a baseline, it describes several possible 
post-2014 scenarios based on different as-
sumptions about key variables, such as the 
outcome of political transition and how these 
various post-2014 environments would im-
pact narcotrafficking. These scenarios can 
then inform policymakers in both the Rus-
sian Federation and the United States on key 
areas of cooperation in order to shape the 
post-2014 environment and to mitigate the 
expansion of the shared threat from Afghan 
narcotrafficking.
Poppy fields
near Jalalabad.
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The post-2014 transition in Afghanistan is not unprecedented in recent his-tory. A major international intervention 
in Afghanistan came to an end just over 20 
years ago. Many of the participants in that 
conflict are participants in the current con-
flict (though old allies are now enemies and 
vice versa). It is thus instructive to explore the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to help 
frame the possible outcomes of the end of 
the ISAF mission.
Although the war in Afghanistan in the 
1980s is significantly different from the war 
in Afghanistan in the 2000s, there are some 
striking similarities. Most notably, the So-
viet government, like the United States and 
ISAF, were confronted with the challenge of 
extricating itself from a long-running conflict 
while ensuring at least some stability for the 
government in Kabul. In both cases, the gov-
ernment in Kabul was divided along regional, 
ethnic and political lines. In both cases, the 
economy of Afghanistan was highly depen-
dent on foreign aid, though to varying de-
grees, and the insurgents confronting the 
government relied on some level of sanctuary 
and support from outside actors.2
Most importantly, the post-withdrawal and 
transition prospects for Afghanistan were 
grim in both cases. Many analysts antici-
pated rapid collapse in Kabul following with-
drawal in 1989.3 While analysts are not quite 
as dour on the post-2014 prospects for the 
government in Kabul, there is still consider-
able concern for the future and even for the 
survival of the current government.4 Given 
these similarities, it is worth examining the 
Soviet experience of withdrawal and transi-
tion from Afghanistan. First, this experience 
helps provide a framework for thinking about 
post-2014 scenarios. Second, it also high-
lights that the direst predictions about post-
2014 can at least potentially be prevented by 
international efforts, including Russian and 
U.S. cooperation.
Beginning in 1986, the Soviet leadership be-
gan quietly planning its exit from Afghanistan, 
where it had combat troops supporting the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since 
the end of 1979. In December 1986, the So-
viets informed Afghan leader Mohammad 
Najibullah that Soviet troops would be with-
drawn in 18 to 24 months. In July of 1987, he 
was informed that the withdrawal would be as 
early as a year later.5 As this withdrawal and 
transition began, the security, political and 
economic environments were all challenging.
The security environment was marked by 
government security forces that had im-
proved but were still far from perfect. By 
1987, the Afghan army was still beset by de-
sertions, and recruitment remained challeng-
ing. But overall, the force had stabilized and 
developed some competence. One Soviet 
military adviser commented that by 1987, “… 
the Afghan army had been more or less fully 
Although the 
war in Afghani-
stan in the 
1980s is sig-
nificantly dif-
ferent from the 
war in Afghani-
stan in the 
2000s, there 
are some strik-
ing similarities.
The Last Goodbye: 
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Transition in Afghanistan 
1985-1992
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reconstructed” and that “[t]heir officers were 
not bad and they were well armed.”6 The Af-
ghan intelligence service, known by the acro-
nym KhAD, was also much improved.7
At the same time, the Afghan government 
and its allies worked to create militias or to 
bribe existing armed groups to support the 
government. There were a variety of local al-
lies in this category, including “border mili-
tias” and “regional/territorial forces.” These 
varied in size and competence from a few 
dozen gunmen to thousands of well-armed 
and motivated troops. These local allies were 
frequently better paid than their state coun-
terparts. As withdrawal and transition contin-
ued, these militias took on greater security 
responsibility.8
Overall, the result of these improvements in 
government security forces and militias re-
sulted in a stalemate-security environment. 
As withdrawal began, the insurgency was 
unable to seize any key terrain, such as the 
provincial capitals. Yet the government was 
unable to drive the insurgency out of its rural 
strongholds. 
In terms of the political environment, Najibul-
lah was faced with the challenge of maintain-
ing control of a factionalized party while at 
the same time seeking to expand the base of 
support for the regime. The People’s Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was deep-
ly divided between two factions: the Khalq 
(People) faction and the Parcham (Banner) 
faction. These factions had both political and 
ethnic differences, with Parcham more Ta-
jik and Khalq more Pashtun. These divisions 
were deep and had led to fratricidal party 
conflict at various points.9
In May 1988, Najibullah named a non-PDPA 
member as prime minister and threw consid-
erable support into trying to make him seem a 
viable non-communist part of the regime. Yet 
cracks began to appear in the regime, includ-
ing the security forces, as Najibullah thwarted 
a coup attempt in late 1988 by Khalqi army 
officers and subsequently exiled other promi-
nent Khalqis.10
In terms of the economic environment, the 
Afghan government was highly dependent on 
foreign aid to maintain the economy and par-
ticularly to pay for security forces. Tellingly, 
despite the agrarian nature of Afghan society, 
more than half of Afghanistan’s food supply 
was imported. While governments in Kabul 
had been dependent on foreign aid since at 
least the eighteenth century, the scale of de-
pendence by 1988 was much greater than at 
any previous time.11
As withdrawal concluded in early 1989, the 
insurgency launched a major assault on the 
eastern city of Jalalabad. However, the ex-
pectation of a rapid victory was dashed as 
mujahideen limitations in conventional com-
bat were exposed and the cohesion and fire-
In terms of the 
economic en-
vironment, the 
Afghan gov-
ernment was 
highly depen-
dent on foreign 
aid to maintain 
the economy 
and particu-
larly to pay for 
security forces.
Soviet troops 
begin their 
withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, 
1988.
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power of forces loyal to the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan (DRA) proved decisive. 
The victory at Jalalabad also helped boost 
the morale of government forces.12 This pe-
riod was, according to some observers, abso-
lutely critical, as the psychological impact of 
withdrawal on the government and security 
forces was very serious.13 A defeat at Jalala-
bad would likely have spelled the end of the 
regime.
Najibullah began to maneuver politically after 
the withdrawal, purging his government of all 
non-PDPA personnel. At the same time, he 
made a series of diplomatic overtures to the 
United States and offered the insurgents lo-
cal autonomy in exchange for an end to the 
war. Najibullah also began to play up both his 
Islamic faith and his Afghan nationalism.14 
Soviet external support continued through-
out 1989, and the result was, to the surprise 
of many, a stalemate rather than the collapse 
of Najibullah’s government.
The situation in 1990 remained broadly 
similar to that of 1989, with some notable 
developments. First, there was yet another 
coup attempt, which highlighted the ongoing 
Parcham-Khalq split in the PDPA. Though it 
failed to oust Najibullah, it was nonetheless 
serious, as it included the defection of the de-
fense minister to the insurgency.  
External aid to the Najibullah regime from the 
Soviet Union continued at a rate estimated 
at over $300 million a month. A major com-
ponent of external aid was oil and petroleum 
products, which enabled the security ser-
vices to maintain aviation and other mobile 
operations, providing a major advantage over 
the insurgents. Najibullah continued to use 
aid to buy loyalty and/or neutrality from mili-
tias and to reward the security services such 
as KhAD. This often took the form of “infor-
mal reconciliation,” where former insurgents 
stopped fighting against the regime without 
making a formal declaration of reconcilia-
tion. In addition to buying support, he shifted 
his stance on insurgency, offering to create 
a national reconciliation government, which 
would transition to elections. He even offered 
to give some security powers to the commis-
sion that would oversee the elections. The re-
sult was yet more stalemate, though Najibul-
lah’s regime did lose one provincial capital, 
Tarin Kot in Uruzgan province, as many of the 
security forces there surrendered without a 
fight to the insurgents.
At the beginning of 1991, the stalemate con-
tinued, but major changes were coming.  In 
April, a coordinated attack on the provin-
cial capital of Khost, led by Hekmatyar and 
Haqqani and supported by Pakistan, was the 
first successful conventional operation by the 
mujahideen, using both tanks and artillery.15 
Najibullah’s response to the fall of Khost and 
rebel assaults on other cities was to continue 
attempting to refashion his regime to make it 
an acceptable partner in a transition govern-
ment. He renamed the PDPA the “Homeland 
Party” and further embraced Islam. The alli-
ances with local militias also remained vital to 
regime survival.16 Informal or local reconcilia-
tion continued during this period. 
The biggest change in 1991 was in terms of 
external support. External aid for Najibullah 
began to decrease as the Soviet economy 
faced its own troubles. Fuel deliveries fell, 
which helped ground significant portions of 
the air force. Following the attempted coup 
of August 1991, the Soviet Union abruptly 
shifted its position on aid to Afghanistan and 
agreed to cut aid to Kabul if the United States 
would cut aid to the insurgents.
At the beginning of 1992, the prospects for a 
relatively peaceful transition to a post-com-
munist regime were good. In March 1992, 
Najibullah made a final concession that many 
insurgents had been waiting for: he agreed to 
step down from power. With this concession, 
reconciliation and peace seemed at hand. 
Following the 
attempted 
coup of Au-
gust 1991, the 
Soviet Union 
abruptly shift-
ed its position 
on aid to Af-
ghanistan and 
agreed to cut 
aid to Kabul 
if the United 
States would 
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Then things fell apart. In less than a month, 
Najibullah’s regime would be militarily over-
thrown.
The rapid collapse began with a wave of mili-
tary defections from the regime. Even as he 
agreed to step down, Najibullah sought to 
shore up the government’s position by ac-
celerating an effort to emplace his loyalists 
in key security positions. One of these moves 
was an attempt to replace Abdul Mumin, 
commander of the Khairiton garrison near 
the Soviet (later Uzbek) border and an eth-
nic Tajik, with a more loyal Pashtun. Mumin 
balked at being replaced and turned to militia 
leader Abdul Rashid Dostum for aid. Dostum 
defected from the government to join with 
Tajik mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah 
Massoud, and within weeks, the north of Af-
ghanistan was under rebel control. Militias 
began to defect at an increasing pace, and 
by April, Kabul had fallen and the Najibullah 
regime was finished.17 Najibullah was forced 
to resign by his own party. Unable to flee the 
country, he sought asylum in the United Na-
tions compound.18
The end of Najibullah’s regime highlights two 
key factors that will likely be critical to sce-
nario outcomes in post-2014 Afghanistan. 
The first is the importance of political cohe-
sion inside the regime and particularly in the 
security forces. The internal fighting, coup 
attempts and, finally, defection of security 
forces were far more dangerous to the re-
gime than the direct threat posed by the in-
surgents. In more than two years of fighting, 
the insurgents had only seized two remote 
provincial capitals, while the defection of Mu-
min and Dostum led to the regime’s collapse 
in a matter of weeks.
The second key factor is the importance of 
external support for regime survival. The Na-
jibullah regime and its security forces fought 
much better than expected in the early bat-
tles of 1989, in part because they were well 
supplied, particularly with fuel. Likewise, the 
Afghan economy, though battered by war, 
continued to function with large inputs of ex-
ternal support and supplies. However, as aid 
began to shrink and then ultimately ended, 
both the security and economic environment 
began to falter.
These two factors are obviously intimately 
related. Although the decline of external aid 
did not cause the fissures inside Najibullah’s 
regime, reduced resources meant there was 
both less available with which to buy loyalty 
and less fuel for the government’s aviation 
assets. Fewer resources also meant that the 
insurgent’s chance of victory, dim after the 
early successes of Najibullah’s forces in 1989, 
began to look better, and therefore defection 
became more appealing.  
Although post-2014 Afghanistan will be vast-
ly different in many ways than post-1989 Af-
ghanistan, these two factors will be central to 
all scenarios. Moreover, the post-1989 experi-
ence highlights that careful efforts at manag-
ing withdrawal and transition after 2014 can 
have positive effects. As U.S. analyst Les Grau 
notes, “the Soviet effort to withdraw in good 
order was well executed and can serve as a 
model for other disengagements from similar 
nations.”19 Yet at the same time, the post-1989 
experience also illustrates that initial success 
in withdrawal and transition is no guarantee 
of future stability. Najibullah’s regime lasted 
much longer than anticipated, but collapsed 
very quickly.  
A final lesson from the Soviet withdrawal is 
the impact that such a rapid collapse can 
have on narcotics production. By late 1992, 
one assessment bleakly noted that “[t]he 
booming drug trade has become the only 
major source of revenue for the war-ravaged 
country.”20 Avoiding a similar outcome (to the 
extent possible) after 2014 must be a major 
policy goal of both Russia and the United 
States.
A final lesson 
from the Soviet 
withdrawal is 
the impact that 
such a rapid 
collapse can 
have on nar-
cotics produc-
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The Current 
environment in 
Afghanistan
The security 
situation in Af-
ghanistan has 
worsened sig-
nificantly over 
the course of 
2014 in several 
categories.
The current security, political and eco-nomic environments in Afghanistan are shaky but far from catastrophic. This 
section assesses these environments and 
discusses possible post-2014 scenarios.  
Security in Afghanistan
The security situation in Afghanistan has 
worsened significantly over the course of 
2014 in several categories. First, the perfor-
mance of Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) has been mediocre at best. On a 
positive note, ANSF—the broad category that 
includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), 
the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Na-
tional Directorate of Security (NDS)—have 
decisively taken responsibility for fighting the 
Taliban, an important step. According to the 
most recent official U.S. government figures, 
the ANSF are fighting without ISAF involve-
ment roughly 90 percent of the time.21
In addition, ANSF were able to secure the first 
and second rounds of the 2014 presidential 
election. Although there was significant vio-
lence on the day of first-round voting in April, 
it did not substantially disrupt the election, 
and turnout was reasonably high.22 The same 
was generally true of the second round of vot-
ing in June, though in both cases some ana-
lysts believe the Taliban deliberately chose 
not to launch major attacks.23
ANSF, in conjunction with ISAF, have also 
been able to limit (though not eliminate) the 
threat posed by insider attacks. This joint ef-
fort required significant counterintelligence 
and vetting efforts as well as efforts to pro-
mote understanding between ANSF and ISAF 
personnel. While a U.S. two-star general was 
killed in an insider attack in August 2014, the 
overall threat has been greatly reduced over 
the past 18 months.24
However, these bright spots in ANSF per-
formance are offset by setbacks during the 
summer fighting season. Across the coun-
try, the Taliban have been able to push ANSF 
out of various key positions. Though these 
losses are often temporary, they highlight 
continuing limitations in ANSF capability. In 
the northern province of Faryab, for example, 
the Taliban were able to seize key parts of 
the strategic Qaysar district for three weeks 
in April and continued to threaten the over-
stretched ANSF over the summer.25 Similar 
offensives in eastern Afghanistan were ongo-
ing throughout the summer, particularly in 
the vital province of Nangarhar.26
Most worrisome from a counternarcotics per-
spective has been the heavy fighting in key 
opium-producing regions. Even according to 
the latest U.S. military data, six of the ten dis-
tricts with the most Taliban-initiated violence 
are in Helmand and Kandahar. According to 
the same report, fully 17 percent of the re-
corded Taliban-initiated violence nationwide 
was in just four districts in Helmand.27 
By early September 2014, media reports in-
dicated that Taliban offensives in two of those 
districts in Helmand, Sangin and Musa Qala, 
had come close to pushing the ANSF out. 
These are significant opium-production ar-
eas, and the Taliban have allegedly been aided 
in the fighting by narcotics traffickers. In ad-
dition, Taliban spokesmen have candidly not-
P
o
S
t-2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
13
ed that due to the greatly decreased risk of 
ISAF airstrikes, they have been able to mass 
for ground assaults, a worrisome admission 
for the post-2014 environment.28
The heavy fighting has contributed to signifi-
cant attrition in the ANSF as both casualties 
and ANSF personnel becoming absent with-
out leave (AWOL) take their toll on the force.29 
Again, this trend is most pronounced in some 
key opium-production areas. The official attri-
tion for the ANA 215th Corps, which is based 
in Helmand, was 4.1 percent in March 2014, 
well before the fighting season was fully un-
derway.30 This figure has likely increased over 
the course of the summer fighting season, as 
the ANA (and other components of ANSF) 
have been hard hit in the fighting around San-
gin and Musa Qala.  
Moreover, the official figures for attrition may 
understate the problem. Independent as-
sessments of ANSF have highlighted the con-
tinuing problem of “ghost” personnel—secu-
rity force members who are on the payroll but 
either do not exist or never report for duty.31 
Although the scale of this phenomenon is dif-
ficult to estimate, it probably means that the 
actual number of personnel in some units is 
lower than the number on paper. Therefore, 
although the absolute level of attrition may 
be accurate, this attrition may represent a 
larger percentage of the actual force.
In addition to the burden of heavy fighting, 
the ANSF remain underdeveloped in several 
critical functions. Perhaps most critical is lo-
gistics and maintenance, leading a U.S. mili-
tary report in April 2014 to bluntly note:
From the ministries down to the tactical 
level, GIRoA [Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan] faced a major 
challenge in developing an effective, inte-
grated logistics and sustainment system 
for the ANSF. A lack of trained mainte-
nance technicians combined with a lo-
gistics system that struggled to resupply 
units in the field adversely affected every 
component of the ANSF.32
Although ISAF has been able to mitigate some 
of these logistics and maintenance issues, 
such mitigation will be much more difficult in 
the post-2014 environment. Without effective 
logistics and maintenance, the ANSF will sim-
ply not be able to resist the Taliban.
In addition to logistics, ANSF will continue to 
have limited intelligence capability. At pres-
ent, ISAF is able to mitigate this shortfall as 
well, primarily through technical intelligence. 
But as with logistics, this will be more difficult 
after 2014. Moreover, intelligence sharing be-
tween ANA, ANP and NDS is still limited by 
bureaucratic issues. Thus, even when one 
component of ANSF gains intelligence, the 
intelligence may not be properly exploited.33
The Taliban have also made targeting ANSF 
intelligence capabilities a priority in the 2014 
fighting season. This has been particularly 
evident in attacks on the NDS, which is fo-
cused on intelligence collection. In less than 
two weeks in late August and early Septem-
ber 2014, the Taliban launched major attacks 
on NDS provincial headquarters in Nangar-
har, Wardak and Ghazni.34 Combined with the 
existing weakness in ANSF intelligence, this 
targeting of NDS could result in a significant 
post-2014 shortfall.
Beyond these specific shortfalls, ANSF are al-
most entirely dependent on external support 
for funding. Maintaining the current ANSF 
force level and structure requires roughly 
$6 billion annually, with Afghanistan able to 
provide perhaps $500 million each year. The 
remainder must be provided by external sup-
porters, who are reluctant to continue such 
support levels indefinitely.35
Finally, corruption, patronage and politiciza-
tion continue to plague ANSF. Although politi-
cal issues are discussed in more detail in the 
next section, these issues are reflected in the 
ANSF. The result is that ANSF leaders are of-
ten chosen much more for their ability to pay 
bribes and garner patronage than for their 
combat effectiveness. As with the earlier Na-
jibullah regime, these issues are intertwined 
with the ethnic divide between the country’s 
largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, and the 
minority Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara.36
All of these general ANSF issues affect the 
capabilities of Afghanistan’s Counternar-
cotics Police. Most notably, even before the 
summer fighting season and heavy fighting 
in Helmand, the level of narcotics interdic-
tion had already dropped significantly in the 
south. This was in part due to the drawdown 
of ISAF forces that enable counternarcotics 
but also simply due to the poor security en-
vironment. It is most likely that interdiction 
dropped even further over the summer.37
Without effec-
tive logistics 
and mainte-
nance, the 
ANSF will sim-
ply not be able 
to resist the 
Taliban.
14
P
o
S
t-
2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
Several key leaders of the ANSF are also al-
leged to have ties specifically to opium pro-
duction or smuggling.38 Most notably, the 
provincial police chief of Kandahar, General 
Abdul Raziq, has been alleged to have signifi-
cant and long-standing ties to opium smug-
gling.  Similar accusations were leveled at the 
police chief of Uruzgan.39 Although these alle-
gations have never been proven, it highlights 
the continuing challenge of using ANSF for 
narcotics interdiction and eradication.
Beyond the ANSF, the security environment 
has worsened considerably for the civilian 
population. Civilian casualties are up sig-
nificantly through mid-2014, according to 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA). The source of casu-
alties has also changed, with more resulting 
from civilians caught in the crossfire between 
ANSF and the Taliban and fewer resulting 
from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).40 
This underscores the improved Taliban abil-
ity to mass and conduct military operations 
instead of (or in addition to) relying on the 
harassment of lines of supply and movement.
Finally, transition will have significant impli-
cations for the variety of private and semi-
private security providers that have prolifer-
ated in Afghanistan since 2001. Estimates in 
2012 put the number of such private security 
providers at 30,000 to 70,000. As ISAF de-
parts, many of these contractors are or will 
be unemployed. This creates the potential for 
banditry, predation or recruitment into the in-
surgency. At a minimum, it ensures that there 
will be no shortage of armed men willing to 
provide “muscle” for narcotraffickers.41
Politics in Afghanistan
As challenging as the security environment in 
Afghanistan has become in 2014, the political 
environment is at least as troubling. The pres-
idential election was intended to usher in the 
post-Karzai era, which at least some hoped 
would reduce simmering tensions both within 
Afghanistan and between the Afghan govern-
ment and the West. Instead, it has provoked a 
crisis that could undermine the viability of the 
post-Taliban political order.
The central feature of the crisis is the con-
frontation between two coalitions that have 
coalesced around candidates Abdullah 
Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah is the 
As challenging 
as the security 
environment 
in Afghanistan 
has become in 
2014, the po-
litical environ-
ment is at least 
as troubling.
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presidential candidate most closely asso-
ciated with the Northern Alliance and par-
ticularly the Panjshiri Tajiks. In addition to 
his own supporters, Abdullah has appointed 
Engineer Mohammad Khan, a Pashtun from 
the Islamic Party, and Mohammad Mohaqiq, 
a Hazara with longstanding ties to the North-
ern Alliance.42 This coalition did well in the 
first round of presidential voting but fell short 
of the threshold to avoid a run-off. In the sec-
ond round, Abdullah picked up additional en-
dorsements from some of those who did not 
make the second round, including the candi-
date believed to have the strongest backing 
from Karzai, the former Foreign Minister Zal-
mai Rassoul.
Ghani’s coalition includes supporters of Gen-
eral Abdul Rashid Dostum, who retains for-
midable political support among the Uzbeks, 
and Sarwar Danish, a Hazara from the central 
province of Daykundi. Although not perform-
ing quite as well as Abdullah’s coalition in 
the first round, Ghani’s coalition also picked 
up supporters from some of the candidates 
that did not make the second round. Most no-
table among these was Ahmad Zia Massoud, 
a Panjshiri Tajik who had been one of Zalmai 
Rassoul’s vice presidential candidates in the 
first round.
The second round of presidential voting was 
closely contested, with accusations of fraud 
coming from both camps but most loudly 
from the Abdullah coalition. An arduous re-
count led to an agreement that would make 
Ghani the president while appointing Abdul-
lah to a new “chief executive” position. This 
power-sharing arrangement is still tenuous 
but could potentially resolve the conflict be-
tween supporters of the two candidates. Both 
men were sworn in at the end of September 
2014.43
The two quickly signed the crucial Bilateral 
Security Agreement (BSA) with the United 
States, a key element in maintaining some 
level of post-2014 international support, in-
cluding nearly 10,000 troops. The BSA is 
open-ended in terms of the roles and num-
bers of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It does 
prohibit U.S. forces from undertaking combat 
operations except by mutual agreement with 
the Afghan government. However, in Novem-
ber 2014, the Obama administration decided 
that, at Afghan request, U.S. forces would 
continue to conduct some combat opera-
tions, especially providing air support to the 
ANSF, after 2014.44 In addition to the BSA, 
the Afghan government has signed a parallel 
agreement with NATO to provide roughly an-
other 5,000 international troops, though at 
present those forces will not be participating 
in combat operations.
According to some analysts, this division 
over political candidates reflects an increase 
in tension between Tajiks and Pashtuns. Al-
though this tension is not new, it may have 
reached a new high for the post-2001 era. Pa-
shtun nationalism in particular is singled out 
by some as having experienced an awaken-
ing or rebirth that helped propel Ghani to the 
presidency. This broader tension will limit the 
room for political maneuver, particularly for 
Ghani. If he fails to satisfy his Pashtun con-
stituents, he may soon be deeply unpopular.
 
In addition to the turmoil surrounding the 
election results, there have been other sig-
nificant political events in 2014 that have 
contributed to instability. Perhaps foremost 
among them was the death (from diabetes) 
of Marshal Mohammed Qasim Fahim, one of 
Karzai’s vice presidents. Fahim, a Panjshiri 
Tajik, was widely viewed as the enforcer of 
discipline, through both carrots and sticks, 
among the sometimes fractious components 
of the Northern Alliance. In particular, he was 
believed to be important in keeping the pow-
erful governor of the key northern province 
of Balkh, Atta Mohammad Noor, in check. He 
was also a longstanding link between the gov-
ernment and the Northern Alliance.45 His ab-
sence as both enforcer and mediator makes 
the current political crisis more troubling and 
harder to resolve.  
These divides highlight one difference be-
tween the Soviet and ISAF experiences with 
withdrawal and transition. The Soviets had a 
partner who was, according to some, charis-
matic and strong-willed even if he confronted 
similar divides between the Parcham and 
Khalq factions. His strong base in KhAD fur-
ther reinforced his position. In contrast, Ghani 
faces a political environment that is at least 
as factionalized and may or may not have the 
level of charisma, ruthless will and security-
service support that Najibullah enjoyed.46
The linkage between political factions and el-
ements of the ANSF makes the political cri-
sis deeper, as it raises the possibility of ANSF 
fragmentation or even an attempted coup. 
In August 2014, the Afghan government ex-
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pelled a reporter from The New York Times 
for allegedly falsely reporting rumors and 
intimations by some Afghan officials about 
the possibility of a coup attempt.47 Although 
it is impossible to verify coup rumors, they 
have not been confined to just The New York 
Times’ reporting.48
Politics below the national level reflects the 
divisions at the top but with additional rival-
ries and conflicts stemming from local condi-
tions. As noted, the governor of Balkh, though 
aligned with Abdullah, has his own agenda. 
These intra-ethnic divisions are present in 
all the major groups in Afghanistan to vary-
ing degrees. Thus, even if the power-sharing 
arrangement holds at the national level, it 
would not resolve all political issues. Center-
periphery divides and clashes are a recurring, 
almost continuous, theme in Afghan political 
history, and the post-2014 period is unlikely 
to be any different.49
These political issues, like security, are linked 
to opium production. In Balkh province, suc-
cessful poppy eradication has depended 
heavily on its importance to Governor Atta, 
who has persisted in efforts despite seeing 
little in terms of outside support. His efforts 
to limit poppy have been bolstered by his 
overall concentration of power and the rela-
tively robust health of the provincial econo-
my. Fighting poppy is both within his power 
and interest.
  
In contrast, in neighboring Badakhshan, field 
research by David Mansfield finds the state 
unable to extend its writ, and poppy eradi-
cation varied widely by geographic area.50 
Power in Badakhshan is fragmented, with a 
group associated with Tajik Defense Minis-
ter Bismillah Khan confronting those loyal to 
Parliamentarian and local strongman Zalmei 
Khan. Mansfield notes: “Such is the competi-
tion and antipathy between these two forces 
that the incursion of insurgent groups in the 
province are in part attributed to the actions 
of both sides as they attempt to undermine 
the patronage networks of their rival.”51 Tal-
iban have certainly gained popularity in some 
areas of Badakhshan by blocking opium 
eradication.
Political divisions are not the exclusive prov-
ince of the government. There are a variety of 
factions within the broader Taliban, perhaps 
most notably the semi-autonomous Haqqani 
Network. In addition, the same sort of center-
periphery challenges the central government 
faces also confront the Taliban. Analysts have 
noted a divide between the senior leadership, 
based in Pakistan, and the field commanders 
in Afghanistan.52 A similar divide was noted 
in the insurgency in the 1980s and may have 
contributed to the chaos after 1992. Indeed, 
the following quotation from 1991 could soon 
be applicable today (albeit perhaps with ref-
erence to opium rather than marijuana):
Not surprisingly, many of the field com-
manders, disillusioned by the constant 
in-fighting among the leadership, have 
asserted their autonomy and pursued 
their own ambitions, either by fighting 
with the government forces or by enter-
ing into secret deals with Kabul. In many 
of the so-called “liberated” areas the field 
commanders have established their re-
spective “spheres of control”, levying tax-
es on passengers, trucks and buses that 
pass through their territories, and not 
infrequently funding their bands of muja-
hidin through the lucrative cultivation of 
marijuana.53
These divides may mean that the Taliban af-
ter 2014 will be less rather than more formi-
dable, as internecine struggles may come to 
the fore with ISAF gone. Indeed, David Mans-
field argues that in many areas, it is already 
difficult—if not impossible—to speak of “the 
Taliban” as a single entity.54 At present, the 
Taliban appears to have sufficient cohesion to 
mount significant attacks even as 2014 draws 
to a close, but the possibility of further loss of 
cohesion remains real.
The Afghan economy
The Afghan economy has not done well in 
2014, which has compounded the need for 
external support as government revenues 
have contracted.55 According to the World 
Bank in 2013, consumer and investor confi-
dence were already contracting due to uncer-
tainty over the post-2014 environment.56 It is 
unlikely that this confidence has increased 
significantly given the security and political 
problems experienced this year.  
Indeed, a July 2014 survey of businesses by 
the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry (ACCI) found that business was worse 
than business owners had anticipated three 
months earlier. In addition, the report noted: 
Politics below 
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ming from lo-
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“A considerable number of companies reported 
to be closed or downsized. At least 9.9 percent 
of the employees of the surveyed companies 
had lost their jobs in a most favorable season 
of the year, which is unprecedented in our sur-
veys.”57
A significant portion of Afghanistan’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP) is reliant on international 
assistance, both from foreign governments 
and non-governmental organizations.58 This in-
cludes spending on ANSF, which indirectly ben-
efits the economy through both ANSF salaries 
and local acquisition of goods like food. It also 
includes ISAF spending in Afghanistan for local 
acquisition, facilities rental, transportation and 
the like. The result is an economic bubble that 
could burst if international aid shrinks signifi-
cantly in the post-2014 environment.
This potential bubble collapse is compounded 
by rising Afghan expectations. Some analysts 
have observed a seemingly genuine belief by 
some Afghans that Afghanistan will be a rich 
country within a few years. This has been driven 
by both international and local rhetoric about 
Afghan mineral resources, as symbolized by the 
Aynak copper mine near Kabul. Yet this mine, 
like the broader possibility for Afghan mineral 
development, is likely to be more image than 
substance in at least the near-term future.59 The 
gap between expectations and reality is danger-
ous because it has the potential to fuel dissatis-
faction with the government.
Although these broader trends affect the entire 
Afghan economy, there is substantial regional 
variation. The economy of the north, centered 
on Mazar-e Sharif, and the west, centered on 
Herat, have access to international markets 
(Central Asia and Iran respectively) that has 
made them somewhat more dynamic and less 
aid-dependent than other regions. Combined 
with a better security environment in those re-
gions, these regional economies will likely out-
perform the other regional centers (Kabul, Kan-
dahar and Jalalabad) after 2014.
Unfortunately, the one area of Afghanistan’s 
economy that seems to be doing well is opium 
production.60 According to some reports, 2014 
is set to be a record-breaking year.61 Although 
close observers note that there is variation in 
the expansion of opium and therefore some 
cause for hope after 2014, at present the trend 
is negative.62
A significant 
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A stable stale-
mate is defined 
as one in which 
neither the 
government 
nor the Taliban 
has a prospect 
of achieving a 
rapid and/or 
decisive vic-
tory but both 
sides are suf-
fering some 
level of attri-
tion. Drawing on both the Soviet experience and the foregoing discussion of the cur-rent baseline, it is possible to identify 
four major possible scenarios for post-2014 
Afghanistan. The key variables are the inter-
nal political cohesion of the country (high or 
low) and the level of external support (mod-
erate or low).  
In this context, political cohesion means 
principally that at the national level, the ac-
cord reached between the Ghani and Abdul-
lah camps (or some equivalent) holds to-
gether. Realistically, this does not mean the 
two camps embrace one another with great 
warmth but rather that they can agree to 
a distribution of political and economic re-
sources that both can live with. At the same 
time, cohesion means intra-ethnic divisions 
do not become unmanageable. In contrast, 
low cohesion presumes that the national ac-
cord does not endure for long after end of 
2014 and/or that intra-ethnic divides become 
more severe.
External support in this context means con-
tinued support from the international com-
munity for the Afghan government. Moder-
ate support presumes that the international 
community continues to provide significant 
financial support to ANSF and Afghan eco-
nomic development, along with a continued 
but much smaller presence of international 
troops to provide training, advice and assis-
tance to ANSF. Low (or no) support presumes 
that the international community after 2014 
provides significantly fewer resources and 
little or no international troop presence.
The interaction of these two variables thus 
yields four theoretically possible scenarios as 
described in the table on the right (see Figure 
1).
Each of these scenarios is briefly discussed 
in the remainder of this section. The focus 
is less on detailed description of the many 
possible variations within each scenario and 
more on the likely implications for policymak-
ers, with an emphasis on counternarcotics, 
for each scenario. The intent is to provide 
policymakers with a structured mechanism 
to evaluate possible futures and to determine 
where Russia-U.S. cooperation is most likely 
to be effective in reducing the shared threat 
of narcotics.
Future Scenarios 
for Afghanistan
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Stable Stalemate
The best possible outcome for a post-2014 
Afghanistan is a stable stalemate between 
the government and the Taliban. Although an 
outright government victory would be bet-
ter, it seems unlikely given the current envi-
ronment and future trends. However, with 
continued political cohesion and external 
support, government forces could at least 
achieve a stalemate.
A stable stalemate is defined as one in which 
neither the government nor the Taliban has 
a prospect of achieving a rapid and/or deci-
sive victory but both sides are suffering some 
level of attrition. Stalemate could potentially 
allow a successful negotiated settlement, as 
both sides conclude that outright victory is 
impossible. Some hypothesize that a “mutu-
ally hurting stalemate” is one of the condi-
tions necessary for such a resolution.63
Stable stalemate is the post-2014 scenario 
that most resembles the current environ-
ment. The political compromise between 
the interests represented by President Ghani 
and Chief Executive Abdullah would endure, 
though its details may vary (e.g. Abdullah 
might step down from his current position 
but remain within the current political frame-
work). Both sides would be able to ensure 
some level of discipline within their networks 
to limit intra-government clashes (e.g. the 
fighting between factions in Jowzjan province 
in June 2013).64
 
Significant but nonetheless limited external 
support would also continue. This would al-
low the government to maintain the ANSF 
as a significant force, stabilizing the security 
environment (current ANSF costs are rough-
ly $6 billion annually). At the same time, the 
“aid bubble” in the economy would deflate 
more slowly, reducing the immediate eco-
nomic impact.
Despite the similarity to the current environ-
ment, this scenario would still have some key 
differences. The contours of control of ter-
ritory would likely be different than the cur-
rent distribution, though much would depend 
on the continued level of external support. If 
the government maintains sufficient external 
support to support the ANSF at the present 
size, it would likely be able to hold a significant 
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Figure 1: Table of Possible Scenarios
22
P
o
S
t-
2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
Yet, even in 
this relatively 
promising 
scenario, inter-
dictions and 
eradication 
are likely to 
decrease even 
from current 
levels. Policy-
makers should 
emphasize 
other tools to 
mitigate these 
shortfalls.
portion of the country against the Taliban. Ar-
eas that are lost to the Taliban would likely be 
those that are remote or peripheral (though 
these may also be important areas for opium 
production). However, the ANSF would likely 
be able to control key lines of communication 
between all major cities and many provincial 
capitals.
If the level of external support shrinks mod-
estly and the ANSF are forced to contract 
more quickly (e.g. from the current level of 
352,000 to something closer to the 2012 
NATO Chicago Summit level of 228,000), 
more significant losses of territory are likely.65 
This might include remote provincial capitals 
such as Parun in Nuristan or Tarin Kot in Uru-
zgan. Although these losses would probably 
not prevent the establishment of a stable 
stalemate, it would be on terms less favorable 
to the ANSF, which would reduce the Afghan 
government’s leverage in any negotiations. 
Under these conditions, the Taliban might 
also be slower to conclude that a stalemate 
was actually stable and thus that negotia-
tions were necessary.
From a policy perspective, achieving stable 
stalemate will require two types of effort. 
The first is to ensure that the preconditions 
in terms of external support and political co-
hesion are met. This will be challenging, given 
donor fatigue in terms of external support 
and unresolved tension in the new Afghan 
government.
The second effort is more operational and 
focuses on reducing or ameliorating some 
of the key weaknesses in the ANSF. Most no-
tably, these include the limitations in intel-
ligence and logistics as well as politicization 
and corruption in the ANSF. The recent col-
lapse of Iraqi forces around Mosul demon-
strates that even forces that have external 
support can be vulnerable to rapid and unex-
pected collapse when they lack logistics and 
intelligence and suffer from politicization and 
corruption.66 While Iraq may not be perfectly 
analogous, the South Vietnamese military 
suffered from similar weaknesses in 1975 and 
also experienced an unexpected collapse.67 
The possibility that the ANSF could suffer 
similar collapses even when receiving exter-
nal support cannot be discounted. However, 
if external support is structured to ameliorate 
these weaknesses (e.g. by retaining foreign 
troops that can provide some level of logistics 
and intelligence support), then the likelihood 
is much lower.
Even as the ANSF contract, the Afghan 
economy would also shrink in this scenar-
io. Although continued aid would allow the 
“aid bubble” to deflate relatively slowly, the 
economy would still feel the impact as well 
as some continued uncertainty. This decline, 
combined with ANSF loss of some key opi-
um-producing areas (e.g. parts of Helmand), 
would likely drive some short-term expansion 
of the opium economy.
Despite these challenges, this stalemate 
offers some hope for counternarcotics. Al-
though this stalemate promises little to no 
short-term progress, it does raise the possi-
bility of significant progress in the medium-to- 
long-term through a negotiated settlement. A 
successful negotiated end to the conflict in 
Afghanistan would not in and of itself solve 
the opium problem, but it offers the possi-
bility of refocusing resources from counter-
insurgency to counternarcotics as well as a 
general expansion of the government’s reach 
into key opium-producing areas.
Yet, even in this relatively promising scenario, 
interdictions and eradication are likely to de-
crease even from current levels. Policymak-
ers should emphasize other tools to mitigate 
these shortfalls. Some examples of these 
tools will be provided in the forthcoming re-
port by the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group 
on Afghan Narcotrafficking on border secu-
rity around Afghanistan, the second in the se-
ries of follow-up reports focusing on specific 
issues related to Afghan narcotrafficking.
Losing Ground
A less promising scenario for post-2014 Af-
ghanistan is one in which the new Afghan gov-
ernment maintains political cohesion but be-
gins to lose external support. In this scenario, 
the government would not collapse overnight 
but would be forced to prioritize very limited 
resources and would lose significant portions 
of the country to the Taliban. Ultimately, the 
government would at best hold onto key parts 
of the west and north of the country as the 
Taliban take the south and east. At worst, the 
ANSF would collapse due to lack of funding.
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This scenario assumes, like the previous one, 
that the current political coalition between 
the Ghani and Abdullah camps will hold, but 
unlike the previous scenario, it presumes that 
external support drops significantly after 
2014 in terms of both foreign troops and re-
sources. Even with a Bilateral Security Agree-
ment, the United States and other interna-
tional partners are weary after more than a 
decade of war. Moreover, fiscal austerity has 
tightened Western defense budgets. This 
combination makes it entirely possible that 
even though support will likely continue into 
2015, it may begin to wane rapidly thereafter.
Perception of the Afghan government will 
likely play a significant role in maintaining 
external support. If donors view the govern-
ment as unworthy, then support would likely 
decline rapidly. For example, a perception 
among donors that Afghanistan is not sup-
porting rule of law and human rights could 
lead to significant decline in international aid. 
The same is true if donors perceive that cor-
ruption in Afghanistan is getting worse rather 
than better.
Some of these concerns have already been 
publicly reported in 2013 during the Karzai 
administration.68 Although there is hope that 
Ghani and Abdullah will make fighting cor-
ruption a priority, both men have extensive 
networks that will be seeking patronage after 
supporting them in the elections.69 It is thus 
possible that despite their intentions, corrup-
tion, human rights and the like will worsen to 
the point of significant donor reduction after 
2014. Indeed, the price of maintaining politi-
cal cohesion could be increased patronage.
This scenario is perilous for the government 
in two ways. First, a rapid and significant de-
crease in international troops below the cur-
rent post-2014 plan of roughly 10,000 U.S. 
troops with additional NATO forces would 
hamper the continued development of the 
ANSF. This is particularly important as a de-
cline in funding for the ANSF could jeopardize 
the security of even key regions of Afghani-
stan (particularly Kandahar city and Lashkar 
Gah in Helmand). Based on estimates from 
an independent assessment of the ANSF, pro-
tecting the five largest cities in Afghanistan 
alone would require maintaining an army at 
least 20 percent the size of the current one. If 
one assumes a roughly comparable fraction 
of the current police force, then that mission 
requires roughly 70,000 ANSF personnel.70
Given that attempting to hold just these cities 
without holding any lines of communication 
would be pointless, it is clear that the mini-
mum number of ANSF to have any prospect 
of holding even the most vital terrain would 
be significantly larger. If one assumes that it 
would take roughly double the personnel (ap-
proximately 140,000 ANSF) to secure lines 
of communication and there are no changes 
in how the ANSF pays and equips its forces, 
then paying for this force will require roughly 
$2.4 billion annually (40 percent of the cur-
rent cost of $6 billion), of which Afghanistan 
can pay, as noted earlier, at most $500 mil-
lion in the near term. Thus, if donor funding 
for the ANSF falls below roughly $2 billion an-
nually in the medium term, it is highly unlikely 
that the current government can survive.
Support that is above this rough threshold 
but below the Chicago Summit funding level 
of the ANSF ($4.1 billion annually) might be 
able to hold some other key cities, but its abil-
ity to conduct counternarcotics operations of 
any significance would be virtually nil. Many 
of the key opium-producing regions, espe-
cially in the south, would likely be outside 
government control.
At the same time, the “aid bubble” would like-
ly burst rapidly and painfully in this scenario. 
If aid dropped by half in one year, this would 
lead to a decline in Afghan GDP of at least 10 
percent.71 When compounded with a rapidly 
worsening security situation, the fall would 
likely be greater as investment dried up and 
currency flight to safer havens like Dubai in-
creased.
This combination of declining government 
control and economic contraction would like-
ly result in significant expansion of the opium 
economy with little to no successful interdic-
tion inside Afghanistan. However, continued 
political cohesion at least offers the possibil-
ity for continued cooperation by the Federal 
Drug Control Service of the Russian Federa-
tion (FSKN) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) with Afghan counter-
narcotics units. This at least offers some pos-
sible avenues for intelligence-sharing that 
could allow interdiction outside Afghanistan.
This combina-
tion of declin-
ing govern-
ment control 
and economic 
contraction 
would likely 
result in signifi-
cant expansion 
of the opium 
economy with 
little to no suc-
cessful inter-
diction inside 
Afghanistan.
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Holding Together
This scenario presumes the opposite of the 
previous scenario, with political cohesion 
failing but external support continuing. It is 
distinct from a scenario in which Abdullah va-
cates the position of chief executive but con-
tinues to participate in the political process 
and is able to maintain discipline among his 
supporters. It is also significantly worse for 
Afghanistan generally and counternarcotics 
specifically than the preceding two scenarios. 
In the absence of political cohesion, external 
support is likely to be less effective and hard-
er to maintain.
In this scenario, the current coalition between 
the Ghani and Abdullah camps fails relatively 
quickly after 2014. Some observers believe 
that the two camps could collapse in six 
months.72 Although this may be pessimistic, 
it is very plausible that competition for re-
sources and/or another bloody fighting sea-
son in 2015 could drive the two camps apart 
early in the post-2014 period. This problem 
would be compounded by potential difficulty 
in maintaining discipline in both camps, with 
powerful figures like Dostum and Atta poten-
tially acting according to their own agendas 
in ways that further undermine political cohe-
sion.
The result of this loss of political cohesion is 
difficult to predict, but at best, it would lead 
to suboptimal resource allocation. Many in 
the Abdullah camp and their extended net-
works inside the government and ANSF 
would likely overemphasize defending terri-
tory in the north (e.g. Balkh and Badakhshan) 
rather than in the south (e.g. Kandahar and 
Helmand). This would leave even very impor-
tant regions vulnerable to the Taliban in the 
south and east.
The Ghani camp could attempt to prevent this 
reallocation by changing some of the leaders 
in the ANSF, shifting leadership towards their 
supporters. However, as the Najibullah case 
underscores, this could further alienate the 
Abdullah camp and begin the unraveling of 
the ANSF. The worst case in this scenario is 
the breakdown of the ANSF along ethnic and 
political lines, with the Taliban then well posi-
tioned to exploit this breakdown and signifi-
cantly increase its territory.
From a counternarcotics perspective, this 
scenario is potentially worse than the previ-
ous scenario. It is at least as bad in terms of 
interdiction, as the political will to interdict 
and the security environment to enable inter-
diction would both decline from the present 
level. The opium economy would be roughly 
as bad, as the overall economy would suf-
fer from political division and eroding secu-
rity even though continued international aid 
would prevent or at least ameliorate rapid 
decline.  
However, the loss of political cohesion could 
make cooperation with the ANSF, including 
military advising and intelligence-sharing, 
more complicated. Intra-ANSF sharing and 
cooperation, including on counternarcot-
ics, would be limited. Military advisers, along 
with FSKN and DEA personnel, would have to 
deal with counterparts that were, at best, not 
cooperating, and at worst, hostile to one an-
other. 
The policy emphasis in this scenario would 
be using conditionality of external support 
to force the government to hold together de-
spite political differences. Yet, there are real 
limits to the impact of conditionality. Con-
vincing actors in these environments that 
conditionality is serious can be challenging. 
Even if that is successful, some Afghan ac-
tors may believe that they could benefit more 
from defecting from the government even if 
that meant losing some aid. They may also 
believe that suspended Western aid could be 
replaced by others, including regional actors.
 
A joint Russia-U.S. position on the need for 
unity would be very useful to reinforce the 
conditions for aid. It would help dispel any 
ideas that the two could be played against 
one another. In this scenario, it may be in-
sufficient to maintain full political cohesion, 
but it could be sufficient to prevent the ANSF 
from breaking apart.
Yet, convincing weary donors to continue 
supporting Afghanistan, even conditionally, 
would be challenging. This is especially true 
if, as seems likely, current fiscal constraints 
for many donors continue for the medium 
term. The result could be a downward spiral, 
where donors begin to withdraw aid as politi-
cal cohesion declines, which in turn reduces 
incentives for the coalition to hold together, 
and so aid is further reduced.
A joint Russia-
U.S. position 
on the need for 
unity would be 
very useful to 
reinforce the 
conditions for 
aid.
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The counter-
narcotics im-
plications of 
this scenario 
are likely to be 
catastrophic. 
Interdiction 
would essen-
tially end along 
with all of the 
current Afghan 
counternarcot-
ics apparatus.
Return of the Warlords
The end result of either of the two preced-
ing scenarios (holding together and losing 
ground) could ultimately be the final sce-
nario. In this scenario, both external support 
and political cohesion are low or even nil. This 
scenario would very likely resemble the post-
1992 period in Afghanistan, though with two 
key differences.
As with the post-Najibullah-regime environ-
ment, various strongmen would likely vie for 
control of regions in a shifting pattern of al-
liances.73 The result would be an increase in 
violence as the ANSF broke apart along eth-
nic and political lines. Some of these defec-
tors would likely side with insurgent factions, 
including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Islamic 
Party.
At best, each of the main regional strong-
men might eventually control his area with-
out seeking to expand (e.g. Dostum would 
control the Uzbek region around Jowzjan 
province). This might achieve a fractured 
but nonetheless stable and relatively peace-
ful balance between competing warlords. Yet 
the incentives, both economic and in terms of 
eliminating potential enemies, may push the 
various alliances towards continued and even 
expanded conflict.
One of the main differences between this 
post-2014 scenario and the 1990s in Afghani-
stan is the preexistence of a national shadow 
government in the form of the Taliban. It is 
possible that many of those defecting from 
the ANSF in the south and east could choose 
to align with the Taliban, as the alternative 
might be to fight a two-front war against the 
Taliban and the former ANSF in the north and 
west. The Taliban would have the ability to fo-
cus resources, province by province, to deal 
with those unwilling to align with the Taliban, 
potentially defeating warlords, one by one. It 
is thus very likely in this scenario that the Tal-
iban would dominate much of the south and 
east relatively quickly.  
Yet, the other main difference between the 
post-2014 period and the early 1990s is the 
continued interest of both regional and in-
ternational actors in counterterrorism in Af-
ghanistan. This may cause some actors to re-
main involved in Afghanistan in the post-2014 
period (at least covertly) to a much greater 
extent than in the 1990s. This could prevent 
the Taliban from duplicating its advance 
across almost the entire country, as it did in 
the late 1990s.
The counternarcotics implications of this 
scenario are likely to be catastrophic. Inter-
diction would essentially end along with all of 
the current Afghan counternarcotics appara-
tus. Without significant foreign aid and in the 
middle of renewed large-scale civil war, the 
opium economy would be one of the only re-
liable sources of revenue for many warlords. 
There is strong reason to believe that the Tal-
iban would not act to curtail opium produc-
tion, at least in the near term.  Even at the 
height of their power before 2001, the Taliban 
was circumspect about how fast and hard to 
push limitations on opium production.
Apart from working to prevent this scenario 
from occurring, the policy emphasis must be 
two-fold. First, as with some of the other sce-
narios, Russia and the United States would 
both benefit from coordinating efforts to mit-
igate the expansion of opium. This includes 
most notably strengthening efforts to control 
regional borders, as will be discussed in the 
working group’s forthcoming borders report. 
However, this is politically sensitive, particu-
larly in Central Asia, and so the extent of co-
operation may be limited. 
 
Second, in considering support to anti-Tal-
iban elements, Russia and the United States 
would benefit from some level of coordina-
tion. This is again politically very sensitive, 
but collaboration might allow Russia and the 
United States to influence how other regional 
and international states attempt to intervene 
in Afghanistan. Moreover, a coordinated posi-
tion would give Russia and the United States 
some leverage to make any aid contingent on 
limiting growth of the opium economy in re-
gions controlled by those seeking assistance.
Ultimately, the best policy for both Russia 
and the United States, particularly in terms 
of counternarcotics, is to avoid this scenario 
entirely. Although it is not likely in the imme-
diate post-2014 period, the decline in exter-
nal support and/or political cohesion over 
time could steadily push Afghanistan in this 
direction. The more that Russia and the Unit-
ed States can cooperate to prevent this drift 
from the beginning, the less likely this cata-
strophic scenario will ever be realized.
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The problem of 
Afghan narcot-
ics will likewise 
continue to 
threaten Rus-
sia, the United 
States and 
the rest of the 
world. The 
Afghan state 
has too many 
weaknesses, 
the Taliban is 
too strong, 
and the incen-
tives to expand 
the opium 
economy are 
too high for the 
environment to 
improve in the 
short term.
The working group’s central conclusion is that the post-2014 security, political and economic environ-ments will not be good under almost all conceiv-
able circumstances. The problem of Afghan narcotics will 
likewise continue to threaten Russia, the United States 
and the rest of the world. The Afghan state has too many 
weaknesses, the Taliban is too strong, and the incentives 
to expand the opium economy are too high for the en-
vironment to improve in the short term. Policymakers 
must be prepared for this reality.
However, the possibility of a sustainable and stable stale-
mate should give policymakers hope. It offers a potential 
pathway to a negotiated settlement that could eventually 
begin to reduce the threat from Afghan narcotrafficking. 
At the same time, the possibility of a return to warlord-
ism, though unlikely at present, should draw attention to 
the possible future perils.
Policymakers in Russia and the United States should 
therefore focus effort along two tracks. First, both coun-
tries should explore all possible joint efforts that increase 
the probability of a stalemate that leads to negotiations. 
One clear means is to work together to ensure continued 
political cohesion in Afghanistan. This will require dip-
lomatic coordination so that all major political factions 
receive the same message to remain unified from both 
Russia and the United States.
Second, Russia and the United States must also coor-
dinate efforts to mitigate the negative impacts if stable 
stalemate is unachievable. These efforts will also help 
limit the impact of the inevitable short-term challenges 
in any post-2014 scenario. The recommendations in the 
forthcoming EWI working group’s borders report fall into 
this category of effort. In addition, future EWI working 
group reports will focus on possible joint efforts to attack 
the illicit mechanisms narcotraffickers use to launder 
and transfer money and strategies for alternative liveli-
hoods. In the absence of security preconditions, however, 
it is likely that recommendations in this latter area would 
need to be left to future generations of leaders.    
Conclusion
Harvested poppy 
crops near Kandahar.
P
o
S
t-2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
27
28
P
o
S
t-
2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
1 Ekaterina Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment. Joint U.S.-
Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking (New York: EastWest Institute, 2013), 45. 
2 For an overview of the literature in English on this period, see: Lester Grau, The Bear Went 
Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1996); Lester Grau and Michael Gress, The Soviet War: How A Superpower 
Fought and Lost, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Antonio Giustozzi, War, 
Politics, and Society in Afghanistan 1978–1992 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2000); Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was 
Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2006); 
Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); and Olga Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in 
Wartime: The Soviet Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011). For the view of 
senior Soviet commanders in Russian, see Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragediya i Doblest Afgana 
(Moscow: Iskona, 1995) and Boris Gromov, Organichenniy Kontingent (Moscow: Progress, 
1994).
3 See, for example, the contemporaneous view in Richard Cronin, “Afghanistan 1988: Year of 
Decision,” Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (1989) and Theodore Eliot, “Afghanistan in 1989: Stalemate,” 
Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (1990).
4 For a centrist Russian perspective on post-2014 Afghanistan, see Ekaterina Stepanova, Af-
ghanistan after 2014: The Way Forward for Russia, (Paris: IFRI, 2013). For a centrist U.S. per-
spective on post-2014 Afghanistan, see Seth Jones and Keith Crane, Afghanistan After the 
Drawdown (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).
5 See Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007) and Kalinovsky, A Long 
Goodbye. 
6 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89, (London: Profile Books, 
2011), 138. See also Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime.
7 Giustozzi, War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan 1978–1992, (Washington, D.C.: George-
town University Press, 2000), 98–99 and 266.
8 Austin Long et al., Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces in Af-
ghanistan and Beyond, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), chapter 8; and Giustozzi, War, Poli-
tics, and Society, 206 and 222–223.
9 David Edwards, Before the Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2002).
  eNDNOTeS
P
o
S
t-2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
29
10 Edwards, Before the Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad.
11 See Anton Minkov and Gregory Smolynec, Economic Development in Afghanistan During 
the Soviet Period, 1979–1989: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan 
(Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada, 2007).
12 “Rebel Cabinet Holds 1st Session in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1989; Tim-
othy Weaver, “Afghan Guerilla Assault on Jalalabad Stalls,” The Washington Post, March 26, 
1989; and James Rupert, “Afghanistan Rebels Lose Key Battle,” The Washington Post, July 8, 
1989. 
13 Comment from former Russian military officer, November 2014.
14 See Eliot, “Afghanistan in 1989.”  
15 “Afghan Rebels Torn by New Quarrel,” The New York Times, April 7, 1991.
16 Shah Tarzi, “Afghanistan in 1991: A Glimmer of Hope,” Asian Survey 32, no. 2 (1992).
17 See Kalinovsky, 206-208.
18 Mark Fineman, “Powerful Militia Unit in Open Revolt Against Kabul Regime,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 15, 1992; and Mark Fineman, “Afghan Leader Forced Out by Army, Rebels,” Los 
Angeles Times, April 17, 1992. 
19 Grau, “Breaking Contact.”
20 Shah Tarzi, “Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature,” Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (Feb-
ruary 1993): 174.
21 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), 10.
22 Joshua Partlow, “Violence data show spike during Afghan presidential election,” The Wash-
ington Post, April 14, 2014.
23 Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghans, Looking Ahead to U.S. Withdrawal, Vote 
With Guarded Optimism,” The New York Times, June 14, 2014.
24 See Austin Long, “The Insider Threat in Afghanistan: A First Look at Lessons Learned,” 
(forthcoming from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences).
25 Obaid Ali, “Security Forces Spread Thin: An update from contested Faryab province,” Af-
ghan Analysts Network, June 11, 2014.
30
P
o
S
t-
2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
26 Fabrizio Foschini, “Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers: The fight along the eastern bor-
der,” Afghan Analysts Network, August 18, 2014.
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan, 11.
28 Rod Nordland and Taimoor Shah, “Afghans Say Taliban Are Nearing Control of Key District,” 
The New York Times, September 6, 2014; and Erin Cunningham, “Taliban offensive in southern 
Afghan district ‘worst fighting’ in years,” The Washington Post, August 23, 2014.
29 AWOL includes any unauthorized absence, which can range from desertion to simply com-
ing home late from authorized leave.
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan, 36.
31 See Letter from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to Com-
manding General, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, February 19, 2014, 
online at http://www.sigar.mil and Jonathan Schroeden, et al., Independent Assessment of 
the Afghan National Security Forces (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2014), 94.
32 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan, 2.
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan, 2 and 25.
34 Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amir, “Taliban Attacks in Ghazni Kill at Least 20,” The 
Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014; Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amir, “Six Killed 
in Suicide Attack At Afghanistan Intelligence Compound,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 
2014; and Nathan Hodge and Ehsanullah Amir, “Taliban Attack Afghan Intelligence Service Fa-
cility,” The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2014.
35 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (CRS 
Report No. RL30588). (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 29.
36 See Jones and Crane, Afghanistan After the Drawdown, 7; and U.S. Department of Defense, 
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 72.
37 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghani-
stan, 81–82.
38 Matthieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s Magazine, December 2009.
39 David Zuchinno, “America’s go-to man in Afghanistan’s Oruzgan province,” Los Angeles 
Times, January 12, 2013.
40 UNAMA, 2014 Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: United 
Nations, 2014).
41 Matthieu Aikins, Contracting the Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Af-
ghanistan’s Private Security Industry (New York: New York University, 2012), 5.
42 Engineer Mohammed Khan is from the formally registered Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 
which is separate from but linked to the Islamic Party of Guldbuddin Hekmatyar. At the time 
of writing, the two were divided on political candidates. See Thomas Ruttig, “Bomb and Bal-
lot: The many strands and tactics of Hezb-e Islami,” Afghan Analysts Network, February 2014.
P
o
S
t-2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
31
43 “Ghani Inaugurated As New Afghan President,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Septem-
ber 29, 2014.
44 Mark Mazetti and Eric Schmitt, “In a Shift, Obama Extends U.S. Role in Afghan Combat,” 
The New York Times, November 21, 2014.
45 Fabrizio Foschini, “The Other Transfer of Power: Fahim’s death and Massud’s succession,” 
Afghan Analysts Network, May 2014.
46 Comment from former Russian military officer, November 2014.
47 The original story is Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for 
an Interim Government,” The New York Times, August 18, 2014. For reporting on Rosenberg’s 
deportation, see May Jeong, “Afghanistan orders New York Times reporter to leave over ‘coup’ 
article,” The Guardian, August 20, 2014.
48 Steve Coll, “Dodging a Coup Attempt in Kabul, For Now,” The New Yorker, July 17, 2014. The 
outlines of Coll’s story were supported by August 2014 conversations with Western observers 
in Kabul.
49 See Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press, 2010).
50 David Mansfield, “Our Friends in the North: Contrasting Images of Power and Poppy in the 
Provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan,” April 8, 2014.
51 David Mansfield, field research notes, 2014.
52 Zahid Hussain, “The Taliban Question,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs (October 2014).
53 Gowher Rizwi, “The Endgame in Afghanistan,” The World Today, vol. 47, no. 2 (February 
1991): 25.
54 David Mansfield, “‘From Bad They Made It Worse’: The concentration of opium poppy in 
areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit, June 2014).
55 Kevin Sieff and Joshua Partlow, “Afghan economy facing serious revenue shortage,” The 
Washington Post, April 15, 2014.
56 “The World Bank: Afghanistan Overview,” The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/afghanistan/overview#1. 
57 ACCI Business Tendency Survey Report, Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
tries, July 2014, 1. The survey covered the regions with the largest cities: Kabul, Balkh, Kanda-
har, Nangarhar and Herat.
58 Some observers argue that aid accounts for over 90 percent of Afghan GDP, but that con-
flates total spending on Afghanistan with money actually spent in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, 
even a more conservative calculation suggests that aid accounts for roughly 25 percent of 
GDP. See Borany Penh, “Understanding the Aid to GDP Relation: Not a Piece of Cake,” The 
Huffington Post, July 10, 2013.
59 On Aynak and its troubles, see Lynne O’Donnell, “Chinese firm turns back on Afghan mine 
deal,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2014.
60 For more detailed assessment, see Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint 
Threat Assessment.
32
P
o
S
t-
2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
61 Alice Speri, “Afghanistan’s Opium Economy Is Booming Like Never Before,” VICE News, 
May 22, 2014.
62 Paul Fishstein and David Mansfield, “Despair or Hope? Opium Poppy Cultivation in post-
2014 Afghanistan,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2014).
63 William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International Conflict 
Resolution After the Cold War, ed. by Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2000).
64 Rod Nordland, “After Gunfire, Politicians in Afghanistan Trade Accusations,” The New York 
Times, June 17, 2013.
65 See Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 29.
66 Keren Fraiman, Austin Long and Caitlin Talmadge, “Why the Iraqi Army collapsed (and what 
can be done about it),” The Washington Post, June 13, 2014.
67 George Veith, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75 (New York: Encounter Books, 
2012).  
68 Rod Nordland, “Donors Are Likely to Ask Karzai to Rethink Rights Panel Choices,” The New 
York Times, July 2, 2013.
69 Paul Shinkman, “Afghanistan’s New Leaders Face Plenty of Problems,” U.S. News and World 
Report, September 22, 2014.
70 Schroeden, et al., Independent Assessment, 120-122.
71 See endnote 48.
72 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Afghanistan Presidential Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal,” The Wall 
Street Journal, September 21, 2014.
73 For a discussion of these alliance patterns in Afghanistan during the 1990s, see Fotini Chris-
tia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
P
o
S
t-2
0
14
 S
c
e
n
a
r
io
S
33
ACRONyMS & DeFINITIONS
ACCI  Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries
ANA  Afghan National Army
ANP  Afghan National Police
ANSF  Afghan National Security Forces
AWOL  Absent Without Leave
BSA  Bilateral Security Agreement
DEA  Drug Enforcement Administration, USA
DRA  Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
FSKN  Federal Service for Control on Narcotics Circulation, Russian Federation
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GIRoA  Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IED  Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
KhAD  Afghan Intelligence Service
mujahideen Arabic term referring to those engaged in “jihad” (holy struggle or war). 
  Most closely identified with guerilla groups fighting Democratic Republic of 
  Afghanistan and Soviet forces during the Soviet war in Afghanistan from  
  1979 to 1989.
NDS  National Directorate of Security
PDPA  People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
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the eastWest institute seeks to make the world 
a safer place by addressing the seemingly 
intractable problems that threaten regional 
and global stability. Founded in 1980, eWi is 
an international, non-partisan organization 
with offices in new York, Brussels, Moscow and 
Washington. eWi’s track record has made it a 
global go-to place for building trust, influencing 
policies and delivering solutions.
_
Learn more at www.ewi.info
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